Brian Humphreys v. McCabe Weisberg & Conway by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-13-2017 
Brian Humphreys v. McCabe Weisberg & Conway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Brian Humphreys v. McCabe Weisberg & Conway" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 345. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/345 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






BRIAN C. HUMPHREYS,           




MCCABE WEISBERG & CONWAY, P.C.; RAYMOND MAJCZAN, ESQ. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-15-cv-04355) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2017 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Brian Humphreys appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint and denying his motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  For the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  We also deny 
Humphreys’ motions for oral argument, to vacate, and to strike. 
 Humphreys had a mortgage with Wachovia Bank, which merged with Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A.  Humphreys stopped making payments on his mortgage in 2010, and Wells 
Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings in state court.  In that foreclosure case, 
Humphreys argued that Wells Fargo had no right to foreclose because it had assigned his 
mortgage to Fannie Mae.  The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas rejected that 
argument and granted summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s favor, concluding that even if 
Wells Fargo had assigned some interest in receiving mortgage payments to Fannie Mae, 
Humphreys had not shown that Wells Fargo failed to retain its own interest as the 
mortgage note’s holder in due course. 
 While the foreclosure case was pending, Humphreys brought suit in the District 
Court against the law firm and one lawyer who represented Wells Fargo.  Humphreys’ 
complaint raised a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., based on the idea that the defendants had falsely represented that 
Wells Fargo had the right to enforce the mortgage agreement.  As the Act states, a debt 
collector may not “use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  The defendants moved 
to dismiss the complaint.  Humphreys opposed the motion to dismiss and also sought 
leave to file an amended complaint, but did not attach a proposed amended complaint to 
that filing.  The District Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue 
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of Wells Fargo’s ability to foreclose had already been litigated in the state court 
foreclosure case.  Thereafter, Humphreys filed his proposed amended complaint, which 
raised several new federal law and state law claims, and named numerous additional new 
defendants.  The District Court denied leave to amend, and this appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order dismissing Humphreys’ 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 529-30 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We construe Humphreys’ pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 
U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and may affirm the judgment on any basis that the record supports, 
see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  “[I]n deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations . . . must be taken as true and interpreted 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of 
them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks 
omitted).  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We review the denial of leave to amend for an abuse of 
discretion.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 We will affirm.  Humphreys may not seek to re-litigate matters that the state 
foreclosure case has already resolved.  Humphreys’ claim that the defendants made false 
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statements concerning Wells Fargo’s enforcement rights in the foreclosure case are now 
barred, as that proceeding has resolved the question of Wells Fargo’s ability to foreclose 
on Humphreys’ property.  See Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 767 F.3d 
335, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing issue preclusion under Pennsylvania law).1  In 
deciding that question, the state case necessarily determined that the defendants did not 
make false statements concerning Wells Fargo’s rights in the foreclosure proceeding.  
Wells Fargo produced evidence that it possessed the mortgage note, giving it the right to 
bring enforcement proceedings after default.  The defendants’ contentions on behalf of 
Wells Fargo were therefore not false.  Humphreys raised fraud and other issues as 
affirmative defenses, but the state court rejected Humphreys’ arguments, including his 
assertion that the assignment of the mortgage to Fannie Mae precluded Wells Fargo from 
bringing the foreclosure case as the note holder.  This issue is settled.2 
Moreover, even if consideration of that issue were not strictly precluded in this 
suit, Humphreys’ complaint also fails to state an FDCPA claim because it does not 
                                              
1 Issue preclusion requires, among other things, a “final adjudication on the merits[.]”  Id. 
at 351.  Consequently, it does not matter that the federal complaint in this case was filed 
before the state foreclosure case was decided; rather, the dates of the judgments 
determine preclusive effect.  See Ellis v. Amex Life Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 935, 937-38 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 14).  
 
2 Humphreys’ pending state-court appeal of the foreclosure case does not deprive that 
judgment of preclusive effect.  See Shaffer v. Smith 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (“A 
judgment is deemed final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless or until 
it is reversed on appeal.”); cf. also United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 175 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he pendency of an appeal does not affect the potential for res judicata 
flowing from an otherwise-valid judgment.”). 
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adequately plead that the defendants made any materially false statement that would have 
been confusing to the least sophisticated debtor.  See Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 
F.3d 413, 419-21 (3d Cir. 2015); Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 175-76 
(3d Cir. 2015).  Rather, the allegations of falsity in the complaint set out the kind of 
conclusory and speculative statements that cannot survive a motion to dismiss.  See Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678.  Humphreys’ reliance on Pennsylvania law is also misplaced: 
Pennsylvania courts have held that the holder in due course of a mortgage note is entitled 
to all rights under the note, including the right to enforce payment of the debt, see J.P. 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), and 
Humphreys is wrong to assert that the decision not to record Wells Fargo’s assignment of 
the mortgage makes it invalid, see Montgomery County, Pa. v. MERSCORP Inc., 795 
F.3d 372, 376-77 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 We are also satisfied that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied leave to amend the complaint.  See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.  The new federal 
law counts in Humphreys’ proposed amended complaint relied on the same erroneous 
premise concerning whether Wells Fargo had the ability to foreclose after Humphreys 
stopped making mortgage payments in 2010, and otherwise asserted conclusory 
allegations that are insufficient under Iqbal.  Consequently, “the complaint, as amended, 
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”  In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).  And, with no properly pleaded 
federal counts in that complaint, it was appropriate for the District Court to decline to 
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the proposed state law counts.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c). 
 Finally, we accept Humphreys’ corrections to his filings, but deny Humphreys’ 
motions on appeal for oral argument, to vacate the Clerk’s order of November 17, 2016, 
and to strike the Appellees’ brief.  Humphreys argues that oral argument is appropriate 
because of what he says is the complex factual background in this case and because he 
asserts that the Court might have questions about what he describes as the potential for 
collusion among certain defendants named in the proposed amended complaint.  But as 
neither the factual background in this case nor the circumstances involving the defendants 
have been difficult to understand, oral argument is not necessary.  As for the two 
remaining motions, Humphreys’ argument fails to show that the Appellees’ brief should 
not have been received and docketed following the Appellees’ motion to file out-of-time.  
Moreover, it is clear that the District Court’s orders should be affirmed irrespective of 
whether the Appellees’ brief is considered. 
 Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
